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Prior studies of stochastic democracy have compared it to other forms of governance, 
demonstrated how to scale up or scale down as population changes, and developed an 
algorithm for start-up on Day 1.  Left unanswered is the administrative policy for regulating 
the statutes developed by the legislative bodies.  As the aim of stochastic democracy is design 
of a corruption-resistance form of managing human affairs the implementation of the 
activities of the government must also be robust against undue influence, bribery, and abuse 
of power.  Decision-makers in a stochastic democracy by design cannot be “career” politicians, 
however, the bureaucrats of the government agencies or departments or ministries are 
advantageously retained across the changes in the legislative bodies.  This quality invites 
corruption, the answer to which cannot be simply to apply oversight or policing.  In this paper 
is developed an integrated structure which supplants the Byzantine-derived corporate-style 
hierarchy.  Seven principles are applied to the bureaucracy and their integration and practice 
described herein as administrative policy, the principles being:  transparency of regulatory 
process; not-less-than time limits; disclosure of change proposers; inclusion of economic 
externalities; open debate and notices of intent; chairmanship and participant selection; and 
periodic but stochastic changes in the number of agencies at each level of governance.  This 
latter enforces either consolidation or expansion, within high and low limits, the re-
organization of which will shuffle the reporting structure of the regulatory bureaucracy and 
disrupt entrenched habits and possible corrupting schemes.  When complementing the 
legislative functions this work rounds-out the formation of a corruption-resistant, scalable 
form of truly representative governance for space habitats and societies of arbitrary size. 
I. Background
 orruption is a widely despised but seemingly endemic feature of existing methods of human governance.  Future 
space habitats which grow in population beyond the bounds of military command-and-control offer new 
possibilities to explore new methods of governance.  Towards this end, Stochasticism, also known as Stochastic 
Democracy, was introduced and compared to other forms of governance such as Communism (pure), Capitalism (self-
interest), and Elitism (priviledged).  Agent-based simulations used with diverse, isolated populations interacting daily 
with their government within a sealed habitat for 10 years demonstrated Stochasticism to achieve the fewest deaths, 
greatest productivity, and a more balanced distribution of income than either Capitalism or Elitism1.  Space habitats 
may change rapidly, possibly drastically, whether an increase from the arrival of a generation ship or exodus, or a 
decrease from a decimation by disease or meteorite impact.  A second study explored the ability of multi-level 
Stochastic Democracy government districting to scale up or down by factors of 10 or more using the k-means function, 
finding this to be sufficient2.  A third study investigated the start-up of a Stochastic Democracy government system 
within a single day (Day 1), such as may be required upon a sudden change in circumstance like a collapse of a prior 
government.  In addition to populating the entire hierarchy of decision-makers for a 4 level government representing 
a population of 3,500,000, the start-up algorithm also facilitated a smooth transition to a perpetuating sequence of 
balanced and overlapping service terms by Year 43.  These three studies complete the formulation of the legislative 
body, but beg the question of the agencies, departments, or ministries needed to enact, regulate, and implement such 
decisions and laws as are developed by legislators at each level of the government.  Thus the current work provides 
necessary and complementary guidance on the full development of a corruption-resistant government according to the 
principles of Stochastic Democracy, these being to introduce randomness within constraints so as to thwart undue 
influence, bribery, and abuse of power. 
II. Introduction
Seven aspects of regulatory agencies are outlined which, working in concert and integrated with the legislative body, 
extend the principles of Stochastic Democracy to rule-making, rule changes, and the process by which these are 
derived.  One might argue that corruption of the bureacracy is less of a concern than the law-making body, and while 
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this may be true there can exist considerable motivation for exerting influence by those who would be affected by 
regulations.  Of course, the regulators must work within the strictures of the laws and statutes of the legislative body, 
however a desireable quality of a law is that it spells out the goals, objectives, or limits without defining precisely how 
these are accomplished.  Thus, steps to reduce undue influence, bribery, and abuse of power in the regulatory agencies 
is a worthy endeavor.  Furthermore, while bureacratic agencies benefit from the experience and tribal member of long-
serving public employees these same valued individuals and their culture can become stagnant, hide-bound, 
lugubrious, and non-responsive.  Therefore means to keep this work “fresh” will be introduced using stochastic 
principles. 
 
Principles of  administration in a stochastic democracy apply to regulatory activities in the implementation of statutes 
developed by the legislative body described in earlier studies of this novel form of governance.  In each case the 
application of principles of stochastic, or structured randomness, introduce a means by which to preclude the ability 
to determine outcomes and thus frustrate the efforts of certain actors to unduly influence the rule-making and 
enforcement of the government.  The principle of stochasticism aims to provide, over time, the will of the citizens to 
be properly represented in their system of government.   
III. Methods 
Numerical parameters described herein are designed to be general guidelines and algorithms explained are intended 
to provide principles of operation however the future development of technology, human life, and the structure of 
civilization writ large may change and adapt over time so there should be provisions by which slow and gradual 
adjustements of these parameters and algorithms can be brought into play.  Finally, there must be a threshold at which 
rules and regulations give back over to legislation such that there is balance between the political principles and legal 
framework of the laws and the practical implementation of the means by which they are put into action.  Subsections 
below outline each of the seven key principles of administration of Stochastic Democracy in light of these 
considerations. 
 
III.1.  Transparency of regulatory process 
Transparency is an obvious quality desired for rule-making.  This must include, both during the rule-making process 
and preserved in the rule itself for consideration of future changes the reasons and motivations for the rule, the research 
conducted in developing it, considerations for possible future situations which may impact the rule, and disclosure of 
the parties involved and the sources of funds used by the parties in the development of the rule.  Explicitly the 
following should be considered as fields to be completed in documentation of the rulemaking process: 
Reasons Rationales Tradeoffs  
Considerations 
Compromises 
Balances 
Conditions 
Assumptions 
Opposing Viewpoints 
Documentation must be provided for each step or compilation in the process, namely: Announcement; Materials; 
Proceedings/Minutes; Judgement; Decisions; Rules/Regulations; Penalties; Prosecution (intermediate steps). 
 
There exist legitimate reasons to limit transparency, including:  respect for individual privacy; considerations of 
national security; and non-disclosure of proprietary information of material value to a business or corporation.  In 
every case the rulemaking committee must set a time limit beyond which redacted or secreted information may be 
revealed.  Furthermore there should be a due process of discovery by which interested parties may petition for the 
restricted information to be disclosed so as to provide for special cases too specific or peculiar to anticipate in advance.  
Secret, restricted, confidential, proprietary, or redacted information should be considered a perishable commodity such 
that the more time which has passed the lower the threshold for release. 
 
III.2.  Not-less-than time limits 
Being transparent in operations must include advance notice.  Only with sufficient time can those who would be 
subject to, or stakeholders in, a rule or regulation conduct their own evaluation and prepare their own inputs to the 
process.  How much time is a matter of the speed of communication which may, in the case of widely distributed 
realms in space, experience significant delays simply due to the finite speed of electromagnetic waves.  It must also 
be considered that not every citizen will desire to be involved in every matter under consideration, therefore there 
must not be placed upon each person an undue amount of information to be processed.  Considering that a government 
is only suitable when there is interaction among citizens and a sufficient density of them that most will have discourse 
with their fellows, a probabilistic means may be used to guide the degree to which efforts must be undertaken to 
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communicate a change in rules or regulations.  Taking into account both dissemination and advance notice the 
following two principles are proposed to guide the transparency process: 
(1) At leat 10 percent of the population has a 90 percent change to know of the proposed rulemaking in sufficient 
time that their earliest possible response is no less than 2 weeks in advance of the hearing of the arguments, 
and; 
(2) At least 67 percent of the population can learn or access the information with no more than 20 minutes of 
effort such that their earliest possible reaction thereto is no less than 2 weeks in advance of the hearing. 
 
III.3.  Disclosure of change proposers 
Changes are generally proposed by those stakeholders who either seek benefit or to avoid detriment by said change.  
It is to be expected that certain such stakeholders may not wish their intentions or motivations to be known, such as 
for example, if they might expect an unfair and significant reward from the change.  There should be no impediment 
to stakeholders receiving benefits or avoiding detriments but their motivations should be laid bare to the greatest extent 
possible so that the matter can be decided with the greatest amount of information.  A quote from the financier J.P. 
Morgan is apt here:  “A man generally has two reasons for doing a thing.  One that sounds good, and a real one.  For 
the administration of proposed rulemaking in a stochastic democracy a reasonable requirement is to ask for three 
reasons, each being non-trivial, with the aim that the primary motivation be made manifest.  Another method used by 
change proposers to mask their motives is to employ a front, either person or organization, and providing that entity 
with some motivation so that said entity may list motivations which appear prima facie to be whole.  To completely 
preclude graft in such disclosure may always be unattainable as many humans are experts at dissembling, telling partial 
truths, and masking true motivations.  It must therefore be recognized that, in the absence of perfection, a public record 
of disclosure be kept so that over time the population may become aware of those entities which fail to fully and 
properly disclose their motivations and reasons.  Therefore each stakeholder proposing a change must swear and sign 
an affidavit containing the information outlined below.  To swear here means to give one’s word of honor, or to stake 
one’s reputation, or to beg to be trusted.  The guiding principle being the aphorism from Randall Terry:  “Fool me 
once, shame on you.  Fool me twice, shame on me”.  The affidavit of each change proposer must disclose non-trivial 
responses to the following: 
(1) Personal/Individual 
a. Income received 
b. Non-cash acquisitions received 
c. Services render or entertainment provided 
d. Promises or assurances of the above 
(2) Immediate Family/Guardian Members 
a. Income received 
b. Non-cash acquisitions received 
c. Services render or entertainment provided 
d. Promises or assurances of the above 
(3) Corporations or Trusts in which the proposer is a party 
a. Income received 
b. Non-cash acquisitions received 
c. Services render or entertainment provided 
d. Promises or assurances of the above 
 
III.4.  Inclusion of economic externalities 
An economic externality is a non-costed boon or harm incurred either by the parties directly involved or by third 
parties indirectly affected.  Externalities may be known by those affected, or they may be unknown.  Thus, by nature 
it is difficult nigh unto impossible to identify all economic externalities.  Nor is it efficient to put a cost onto every 
conceivable impact of a decision, action, or rule, as such may be continued ad infinitum and thus ad absurdum.  The 
goal of including such externalities in consideration is to inform the citizens, making them aware of the possibilities.  
It is well known that the principles of some economic theories suggest that an informed marketplace is efficient and 
therefore brings a general benefit to all.  While perfect information is considered ideal but generally unattainable, the 
information provided to citizens according to the principles of transparency described above should include both the 
positive and negative non-costed externalities for the following categories: 
(A) Medical or health impacts 
(B) Environment and climate impacts 
(C) Effects on access and opportunity 
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(D) Nuisances of sound and sight 
(E) Nuisances of time or the burden of effort 
(F) Aesthetic consideration and the impact on appreciation of culture or nature 
In studies of economic externalities the impact on the public can be modified by a so-called Pigouvian tax which shifts 
the price/quantity curve for a given product or service.  The aim herein is not to impose more complex taxes, however, 
during the course of debate and discourse in rulemaking it may become evident that new legislation is required.  Should 
the proceedings become overly lengthy by the involvement of more than one interest (to preclude stonewalling or 
filibustering) the administrative body may recommend to the legislative body to take the matter under advisement.   
 
III.5.  Open debate and notices of intent 
Summarizing and completing the analysis of the prior 4 principles the specific nature of the notice of intent can be 
stated.  This must disclose to all parties the benefits expected or the detriments to be avoided for each stakeholder 
interested to participate.  The process is started by the proposer, who follows the format listed below, and then is 
continued by each stakeholder contributing their own “plusses and minuses” analysis using the same template or 
format.  Entries should be made as simple as possible and no simpler (to paraphrase A. Einstein) using common 
language such that those analyzing and summarizing the responses may aggregate them to such a degree that the 
information provided to the administrative body is neither too trivial nor too voluminous.  Guidance on this balance 
may change depending on the nature of the issue at hand, but also must balance practical issues of timing as will be 
described in the next principle whereby nearly all issues should be resolved within a reasonable time frame aligned 
with the chairmanship of the rulemaking committee.  If this timing is not met the administrative body may recommend 
to the legislative body that the matter be taken under advisement.  Each stakeholder should provide cogent, brief, and 
succint responses in the following format: 
 
ENTITY IMPACTED BENEFITS DETRIMENTS 
You alone non-trivial response " 
Your family or protectorates " " 
Your corporation or trust " " 
Your locality, region, or nation " " 
 
III.6  Chairmanship and participant selection 
Chairman and any other gender-specific term in this work is taken as a linguistic simplification of chairwoman, 
chairperson, or chairman and in no way implies bias of gender or otherwise.  There may conceivable develop 
conditions whereby non-biological entities are considered for positions of responsibility in a stochastic democracy 
and the terminology herein should not be taken to preclude such.  Durations are based on an earth year in 2018 with 
the understanding this is not a constant, and furthermore that the pace of human and intellectual development may 
accelerate or may slow in the future, thus the parameters selected here are intended as guidelines which may be 
modified gradually and incrementally by action of the legislative body of a stochastic democracy. 
 
The administration of a stochastic government is divided into ministries, and sub-divided into departments as 
explained in the next section.  Each department head is responsible to maintain a workforce sufficient to conduct the 
activities allocated by the Minister.  The Minister is selected by the legislative body on the basis of merit and is 
reinstated or replaced on a yearly basis.  Whereupon the ministry is charged with creating or modifying a rule or 
regulation the Minister designates a lead department and the department head forms a rulemaking committee. 
 
The rulemaking committee composition must include members of the general public who have contributed a benefits 
and detriments response per section III.5 above.  As part of the submission process said members may indicate if they 
are willing to serve on a committee, or they may opt out.   The department head is to select an initial committee 
membership consisting of members of his staff with appropriate expertise.  The initial committee shall follow an 
algorithm by which to identify willing members of the general public having contributed a benefits and detriments 
response which represents in a nearly optimal manner the clusters of such responses from the public.  The size of the 
rulemaking committee shall be set by the Minister when informing the department of the proposed rulemaking and 
may range from 5 to 40 members depending on the complexity of the issue.  The Minister should provide a succint 
justification of the selection of size which becomes part of the public record.  Whenever possible, the Minister should 
recommend and encourage a former legislator to participate as a committee member.  The fraction of the rulemaking 
committee comprised of staff members of the department plus former legislators should be slightly less than half.  
Votes on the elements of a rule or regulation must prevail by a two-thirds majority of the committee members.  
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Dissenting members must record their objections and recommendations as part of the documenting containing the 
final rule. 
 
Each rulemaking committee shall have a chairman and a vice-chairman, also a secretary and vice-secretary, the latter 
two of which are responsible for capturing a record of the proceedings, ensuring the completeness and security of the 
documents included, considered, and submitted, and the publication of the document containing the final rule, subject 
to approval by the chair, the department head, and the Minister.  The chairman shall be determined by random lot 
from the committee with equal probability applying to each member.  The vice-chairman is selected by random lot of 
the remaining committee with equal probability exclusive of the chairman.  The chairman may quit at any time, and 
if the chairman quits, or becomes incapable of executing his duties, then a new chairman AND a new vice-chairman 
are selected in the same way.  This provision discourages bad actors from malicious acts towards the chairman in 
hopes that the vice-chairman might advance.   
 
Figure 1 shows the duration of the charimanship as a probability distribution function with a peak value at 1.33 years 
decreasing monotonically to zero at 0.67 years and 2.0 years such that the area under the curve is unity.  At the 
conclusion of the duration of chairmanship a stochastic selection is made to either (a) retain the chairman, or (b) 
replace the chairman by advancing the vice-chairman, using the probability weighting shown in the right side of Fig. 
1.  Upon the advancement of the vice-chairman to chairman, another vice-chairman is selected by random lot exclusive 
of the now-chairman, but inclusive of the prior chairman. 
 
 
FIGURE 1.  Probability functions for chairmanship duration and selection of the next chairman.  Mean 
chairmanship duration is 1.33 years with a 1/3 likelihood of a second term (and 1/9 for a third term, etc.). 
 
The expected duration for chairmanship is calculated from the expression below, and in the limit approaches 2 years. 
𝐷𝐷 = �(13)𝑖𝑖∞
𝑖𝑖=0
1.333� 
 
III.7.  Periodic but stochastic changes in the number of agencies at each level of governance 
Finally, a key part of a stochastic form of governance is introduced by changing the number of agencies at a given 
level of government.  Too few agencies consolidate too 
much control and create too much bureacracy, while too 
many generates inefficiencies and over-specialization 
through which some issues may pass without finding a 
proper home.  Shaking up the number of agencies 
between limits of too few and too many is to happen at 
an aperiodic rate determined by a random variable.  
While such re-organizations will introduce a certain 
amount of waste and delay to process, it also prevents 
stagnation, endemic entrenched thinking, excess 
concretization of positions, and increases the potential 
for innovation. 
 
𝑪𝑪(𝒏𝒏, 𝒓𝒓) = 𝒏𝒏!(𝒓𝒓! (𝒏𝒏 − 𝒓𝒓)!) 
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FIGURE 2.  Histogram of the number of distinct 
ministries from a selection of 12 stable governments. 
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IV. Results 
We obtained graphical and numeric results by conducting research into the organization of a corruption-resistant 
government based upon the compatibility of stochastically assigned departments, that could be used in future colonies 
in space. The methodology utilized involved creating a computer program to organize and evaluate the compatibility 
of the departments being compared. We then created and conducted a survey to obtain the opinion of the public on 
the level of compatibility of the stochastically assigned departments. The survey results were used to create the 
Department Compatibility Matrix (Figure 4), which is then used in the computer program to create potential pairings 
for a corruption resistant stochastic government. We also created a program that ensures that every department has a 
pair and every department is used. 
 
Initially, we created a Department Compatibility Matrix using the 36 departments from Figure 3. The 36x36 matrix 
has a rating of compatibility for every combination of departments. Then we created a computer program (using 
MATLAB) that stochastically paired two departments together. In order for the program to function, we manually 
input one row from the Department Compatibility Matrix and then the code displays two numbers that correspond to 
2 departments in the matrix. This method was used to build the survey questions. The program would ultimately rely 
on the ratings (the level of compatibility) from the Department Compatibility Matrix to shuffle the regulatory 
bureaucracy and reorganize departments at a given level of government (Figure 4).  
 
 
FIGURE 3.  Initial point for 12 ministries each with 3 departments. 
MINISTRY Department Department Department
1 Business Economy Jobs
2 Energy Power Distribution
3 Diplomacy Policy Aid
4 War Security Defense
5 Justice/Law Equity Dispute Resolution
6 Agriculture Water/Land/Air Resources Food
7 Enviro./Ecology Basic Science Engineering Research
8 Education/Arts Youth & Family Homes
9 Aviation/Space Transportation Infrastructure
10 Communications Media Advertising
11 Medicine Health Quality of Life
12 Treasury/Taxes Finance Banking/Currency
 
FIGURE 4.  Department Compatibility Matrix, from survey (symmetric). 
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  In order to get the ratings for the Department Compatibility Matrix we created 18 different surveys containing 35 
questions each; these 18 different surveys accounted for every possible combination within the Department 
Compatibility Matrix. Each question in the survey was a slight variation of the template, “On a scale of 1-100, how 
compatible are the (DEPARTMENT 1) and (DEPARTMENT 2) departments in government?”  We broadcast to 
approximately 300 people through social media and direct email to gain assistance in distributing the survey and 
obtaining survey responses. The large number of people reached included those with a social media following and 
those with a connection to the research field, for example  government, science, and technology. The average response 
across all compatibility ratings was 53 with a standard deviation of 15, with the range extending from 13 (Energy v. 
Youth&Family) to 96 (Transportation v. Infrastructure).  Figure 5 shows a histogram of the result from 67 returned 
survey responses, a sufficient number that each of the 36x36 combinations was evaluated no fewer than three times. 
 
 
 
Finally, the results from each survey question are averaged to form the corresponding rating in the Department 
Compatibility Matrix. These ratings are then used within the computer program to stochastically pair the 36 
departments. A potential organization of departments based on the current Department Compatibility Matrix is 
depicted in Figure 6. The software code and the survey were designed to ensure that all governmental departments 
were used and that each had a pair. Based on the stochastically generated pairings from the results we obtained, it is 
unlikely that one could have predicted the combinations, and therefore this strategy for organizing government is 
corruption-resistant. 
V. Discussion & Recommendations 
 
Employee management within an agency should avoid conflict with the regulated industry, and should minimize 
opportunities for influence by industry through bribery, coercion, or threats.  Private operation or control of the 
bureacracy is to be avoided so as to preclude the profit motive influencing rule-making and regulation.  Permanent 
employees must have the highest degree of indepedence applied to the hiring process and retainment process.  
Promotion within the organization is primarily via advancement of permanent employees, with there being a 
reasonable amount of cross-agency staff movement to bring in fresh ideas and methods of management.  Pursuit of 
advanced degrees, paid by the agency, is to be encouraged for higher level staff members.  Contract employee ranks 
may swell or dwindle based on the quantity of work.  Contract employees are generally at the lowest level of the 
bureacracy, they may have conflicts, but will have minimal influence on their superiors and the overall function of the 
organization.  Contracts of finite duration, with provisions for changeover of staff, with a detailed review for conflicts 
for renewal.  Promotion within the organization is primarily via advancement of permanent employees, with there 
being a reasonable amount of cross-agency staff movement to bring in fresh ideas and methods of management.  
 
FIGURE 5.  Survey results for correlations between all departments (N=67). 
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Pursuit of advanced degrees, paid by the agency, is to be encouraged for higher level staff members.  Contracts of 
three years, with a detailed review for conflicts for renewal.  Promotion for longevity of service should be positive, 
but modest.  Pay schedule should be common across agencies and decided upon by the legislative body.  Survey 
results indicate the plausibility of using public opinion as a guide in organizing this new corruption-resistant 
government. 
 
Stochastically Generated Pairs 
Business - Treasury/Taxes 
Economy - Distribution 
Jobs – Quality of Life 
Energy - Education/Arts 
Power - War 
Diplomacy - Agriculture 
Policy - Homes 
Aid - Finance 
Security - Banking/Currency 
Defense - Water/Land/Air Resources 
Justice/Law - Health 
Equity - Medicine 
Dispute Resolution - Aviation/Space 
Food - Communication 
Environment/Ecology - Basic Science 
Engineering Research - Infrastructure 
Youth & Family - Advertising 
Transportation - Media 
Figure 6. One arrangement of Departmental pairings based on public survey results. 
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